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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-v-
RONALD LEMOYNE KELLY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Ronald Lemoyne Kelly, apoeals from his con-
viction for the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§76-5-202 (1) (d) (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant was charged by Information with one count of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a Caoital Offense, 
with certain multiple alleged aggravating circumstances. At the 
Preliminary Examination held on April 5 and 6 of 1982, all but 
two aggravating circumstances were dismissed. The two aggravating 
circumstances not dismissed, but bound over, were that the killing 
took place, "while the actor was engaged in the commission of, or 
attempting to commit rape and/or aggravated sexual assault." 
On May 5, 1983, after approximately four weeks of trial, 
the court found Mr. Kelly guilty of the Criminal Homicide, :iunie 
in the First Degree, and imoosed the sentence of life imprison~er 
due to the court's finding that the death Penalty was not annro-
priate under the circumstances of this case. The Defendant, t!r. 
Kelly, was sentenced to life imprisonment and committed forthwitr. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt 
rendered by the trial court at the guilt phase of the trial to the 
offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a 
Capital Offense, and a dismissal of the charge. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant/Defendant, Ronald Lemoyne Kelly, was out in 
the evening hours of February 9, 1982, with friends at several 
locations. At approximately 1:30 a.m. of Februarv 10, 1982, Mr. 
Kelly met up with four individuals outside of the Caladonia Apart-
ments located on the northwest corner of Sixth South and Fifth 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Kelly requested these friends, 
among them a native Venezuelan nick-named "Tido," to accomoany 
Mr. Kelly to the apartment house located at 605 South 500 East in 
order for Mr. Kelly to use the telephone in one of the apartments 
located there belonging to a Darla Cates, a close nersonal friend 
of Mr. Kelly's. All of the friends declined to accompany Mr. 
Kelly and they parted company with Mr. Kelly at that time. 
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At approximately 3:30 a.m., Februarv 10, 1982, two peonle 
living directly below the deceased, Carla Taylor, heard what they 
believed to be a scream and some other noises emitting from the 
1partment of the victim, Carla Taylor. All was quiet when they 
heard footsteps descendin? the common area stairs from the apart-
ments upstairs and the door to the outside front porch open and 
shut. These two people, Elizabeth Langford and Clark Campbell 
testified that they peeked out of their front room window that 
was covered with two sets of curtains to see a man, dark in 
coloration, wearing a dark ski partk and gloves. Their 
vision was somewhat limited due to the nature of their observa-
tion and the fact that the light which normally lightens the 
porch area of the converted old home was not on. 
Even though Mr. Campbell did not want to get involved in 
a believed dispute between a boyfriend and the victim, ~<s. 
Langford finally prevailed on him to put on his tennis shoes and 
go across the street to call the police, anonymously, from a 
public pay phone. 
Officer Frank Hatton-ward of the Salt Lake Police Denart-
ment was dispatched to the address of 605 South 500 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and proceeded into the apartment building, uo 
the common stairway and knocked on the door of the one of two 
upstair apartment doors belonging to the victim, Carla Taylor. 
Receiving no answer to the officer's request for entry he tried 
the door and found it to be unlocked. As the officer opened the 
door to the victim's apartment all lights were off inside and so 
-3-
with the aid of a flashlight, the officer illuITJinated the inside 
of the apartment and observed the body of the victim in the front 
living room portion of the apartment. Officer Hatton-ward deter-
mined that the victim was dead and had a 14-inch kitchen-tvne 
knife in her chest anu a toothbrush inserted in her vagina, 1,7hic~ 
was exposed. 
After a quick search of the aoartITJent, the officer found 
three possible entrances into the apartment; the front door by 
which he hau entered, which was unlocked, a bacl: door leading to 
a rear parking area that was partiallv open but secured with a 
chair, and a doorway leading from the victim's anartment to the 
apartment of Darla Cates who lived with a black ITJan bv the name 
of Jerome Thorton. 
The officer located the two witnesses, Ms. Langford, and 
Mr. Campbell, and afLer learning that the man they saw had left 
on foot, the officer searched only the front portion of the apart-
ment house and found what they believed to be footprints leaving 
the apartment house. Apparently the officer was never told that 
in Mr. Campbell's unsuccessful attempt at aiding the victim, he 
too had left the apartment house and transversed the street wear-
ing tennis shoes to call the police. 
The prints the police chose to follow, although inter-
mittent, lead them to the apartment house of the Apnellant, Mr. 
Kelly, (T. 201) and upon demanding entry, Mr. Kelly, clothed onlv 
in his underwear was confronted with no less than three uniformed 
police officers who immediately began to ask his whereabouts on 
the morning in question. 
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Detective Farnsworth of the Salt Lake Police Deoartment 
was the first to enter the Appellant's home with Mr. Kelly still 
standing in his underwear. Prior to any Miranda warning, 
Tlclective Farnsworth demended to know if Mr. Kelly had "killed 
1:c·:one tonight," or "knifed anyone tonight." Mr. Kelly res-
ponded, "Are you serious?" (T. 209). 
Detective Farnsworth, who had followed some intermittent 
orints in the snow to the Appellant's residence had received two 
conflicting descriptions of a suspect. The first description 
was of a black male adult, wearing a black or navy coat with a 
red stripe. The second description was of a white male adult, 
wearing the same coat as described above. It was this second 
description which Detective Farnsworth was working with when 
he stood on the porch of the Appellant's home and confronted 
the Appellant, a black man in his undershorts. 
As he entered the Aopellant's residence, Officer Farns-
worth observed a ski oarka on the couch, royal blue in color 
with beige shoulders and a red stripe in a v-shaped pattern 
!T.198). Officer Farnsworth again told Mr. Kelly that he was 
investigating a homicide and that he had followed a set of foot-
prints to his house. He asked Mr. Kelly is he had been out dur-
ing the night and what shoes had he been wearin>;. The Defendant 
went to the bedroom, followed bv the officer (T.195), and a oair 
of shoes was seen by the officer. Officer Farnsworth seized the 
shoes without a warrant (T.199). Officer Bernard entered the Defen-
dant's residence at this time. He did not request oermission to 
enter nor was any permission given by Mr. Kelly. Officer Martin came 
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into the residence without requesting permission to enter either 
Officer Farnsworth then read the Defendant hi~ 'liranda rights. 
Defendant said he was familiar with the ~<iranda rights. Office' 
Farnsworth asked him if he wished to answer any questions and 
the Defendant said, "I don't know." Officer Farnsworth told 
him that was not the right answer (T. 176) and said "Do you 
want to answer questions or don't you?" The Defendant reolied, 
"Well, I don't know, it depends" (PHT 115). Officer Farnsworth 
said, "Well let me ask you again. We are investigating a 
homicide, a murder. It is a serious offense. He followed some 
footprints here and you have shown me some shoes and those were 
the same footprints I have been following. Were you at the 
house tonight 0 " The Defendant did not answer that question. 
Then Officer Farnsworth asked the Defendant what clothes he was 
wearing. The Defendant indicated a black shirt, black pants, 
and two pairs of socks. The officer seized all these clothes 
and informed the Defendant that he would have to come with him 
to speak to detectives in regards to the homicide (T. 180). 
Sargent Martin and Captain Bernard then checked the apartment 
"for other pesons." Sargent Martin found a pair of gloves on 
the bathroom floor. He asked the Defendant if he had worn them 
that night and the Defendant said he had. The gloves were 
seized and the coat in the front room was also seized. At approx· 
imately 4:31 a.m. the Defendant was put in the back of a police 
car. Officer Bernard stayed at Mr. Kelly's residence "securing 
it and showed the video technician, Hr. Cowley, what needed to 
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be taped." At 6:50 a.m. the front room was taned, as well as the 
r1-10 purses. Detective Abbot was contacted at 6: 50 a .m. also, and 
cissigned to secure a search warrant for 637 Brixten Court. A search 
',·.1arrant was served at 9:30 a.m. The return of that warrant con-
taining a list of what property was seized is attached hereto. 
(See Appendix A.) 
At the trial of this matter, Officer Fransworth testified 
that the Defendant did not give consent to search his residence or 
to seize any of his pronerty. Ronald Kelly remained in various 
police cars from 4: 30 a .m. until he was later taken to the !1etro-
oolitan Hall of Justice to be interrogated. Before that inter-
rogation the Defendant was asked a number of questions by police 
officers while in police cars. Upon arriving at the Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice he was interrogated by Detective Chanman from 5:25 
a.m. to 7:55 a.m. This interrogation was recorded and has been 
tran~cribed by the police department. 
During this interview with Detective Chapman, Appellant 
stated that he did indeed go over to the anartment comnlex located 
at 605 South 500 East. Appellant went on to state that he went 
upstairs to request of Darla's boyfriend, Jerome Thorton, the use 
of the phone to call a taxi cab to take him home due to the stormy 
weather. The Appellant went on to explain that when he got to the 
front door, 
door. He 
and rang the bell, Jerome Thornton never came to the 
left down the stairs, paused at the front porch area 
to zip up his coat and put his gloves on and then walked home. 
It was later determined that the auartment of Darla Cates 
'>1as directly across from the victim's apartment and that they were 
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attached by a common hallway used by all, but also bv a passage-
way that was only accessible bv the two apartments of Darla Cates 
and the victim. It was also determined that on the night of the 
murder, Darla Cates had left and gone to Idaho and Jerome Thort<q 
was living alone in the adjoining apartment of the victim, Carlo 
Taylor. The only way to lock the connecting door between these 
two apartments was from inside Jerome Thorton's apartment. The 
door on the victim's apartment oreviously had been broken bv the 
victim when she left her kevs inside her apartment (T.223, 224). 
The victim died of multiple stab wounds to the chest 
(T. 339). Three hairs were found on the right buttocks of the 
victim, one of which was determined to be negroid oubic hair 
having characteristice similar to those hairs taken from the 
pubic region of the Appellant (T.558). Testimony showed that 
Appellant, prior to February 10, 1982, had been in the victim's 
apartment. The black man living across the hall had also been 
in the victim's apartment prior to February 10 (T.151, 152). 
The Appellant was arrested at his home in the early 
morning hours of February 10, 1982, and brought to jail after a 
lengthy interrogation period. He was charged with First Degree 
Murder and was subsequently convicted of this offense, and from 
this conviction he now takes this aopeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE 
DEFENDANT WHEN THE POLICE ENTERED HIS RESIDENCE 
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE , 
DEFENDANT'S SHOES WERE EVIDENCE OF A CRIME, 
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)10 LEGAL RIGHT TO FOLLOW THE DEFENDANT TO HIS BED-
R0011 AND THE SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
SHOES AND OTHER CLOTHING HAS ILLEGAL. 
Hithout probable cause to arrest the Appellant, Detective 
Fdrnsworth had no legal right to follow the Apnellant to his bed-
room. The Appellant had consented to Officer Farnsworth's entry 
into his front room, he did not consent to the officer's following 
him to his bedroom (T. 195). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
mere acquiesence to perceived police authority will not support a 
search based on consent regardless of lack of overt coercion. 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 88 S.Ct. 
1788 (1968). Even if Officer Farnsworth had had a right to be in 
the Appellant's bedroom and therefore had a legal plain view of 
these shoes, a plain view seizure is limited to items that are 
clearly incriminating. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749 
(8th Cir. 1978). The law requires a nexus between an item to be 
seized and criminal behavior and the orobable cause necessary to 
seize a particular item must be examined in terms of "cause to 
believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular appre-
hensionorconviction." Wardenv. Hayden, 387U.S. 294, 307, 181. 
Ed.2d. 782, 793, 87 S.Ct. 1642 (1967). Coolidge v. !fow Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 446, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971), 
required that the incriminating nature of articles seized must be 
irrnnediately apparent. 
The shoes taken from the Appellant's bedroom were not 
obviously contraband or weapons. Their connection with the homi-
cide Officer Farnsworth was investigating was based solely on the 
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Appellant's pre-Miranda admission that he had been wearing them 
that night. Blood was not observed on the shoes until well after 
they had been seized. The Pattern on the bottom was not observe~ 
until after they had been seized. 
Thus, without rrobable cause to arrest the Annellant, 
these shoes were illegally observed and illegally seized. In 
addition, if the seizure of the shoes is found to be illegal, the· 
cannot become the basis for orobable cause necessarv to arrest the 
Appellant and seize other items of his clothing (his pants and 
gloves) under the ~:·uit of the noisonous tree doctrine. l·Jong Sun 
v, United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963\ 
POINT II 
WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO .-\RREST RONALD KELLY, THE APPELLANT WAS 
SUBJECTED TO A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION FROM THE 
TI~~ THE POLICE OBSERVED HIM AND ENTERED HIS 
RESIDENCE, AND ANY STATEMENTS HE MADE PRIOR TO 
BEING INFORMED OF HIS MIR.At'IDA RIGHTS MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 16 L.Ed.2d 684, 706, 
84 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), mandated that as a constitutional orerequisit. 
to any questioning, an individual held for interrogation by a law 
enforcement officer must be warned in clear and unequivocal terms 
of his right to rel!lain silent. In State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 216, 
429 P.2d 969 (1967), the Utah Suoreme Court carried this farther 
and held that when an accused is detained in any significant wav, 
he may not be interrogated unless he is advised of the charges 
against him. The Court defined "an accused" as "the target of an 
investigation." "To fail to so warn one so being investigated is 
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to entrap him and to violate his constitutional privilege against 
s~lf-incrimination. A person cannot determine whether or not he 
11ceeds counsel unless he was fully advised of the charges being 
c:.msidered against him." 429 P.2d at 973. 
Under the Miranda rule, the decisive state of custodial 
interrogations is reached when there is questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custod;r or otherwise deprived of his freedol'l of action in any 
significant way (T .195, 196). 
Courts have expanded upon the objective definition of 
custodial interrogation as cited above, and they have expressly 
adopted the view that under the Miranda rule, a person is sub-
jected to "custodial interrogation" not only if he is questioned 
•.-1hen in custody or when deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way, but also if he is questioned when he reasonably 
believes that he is so deprived. People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 
58 Cal.Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515 (1967); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 
(Utah 1983); People v. Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412, 60 Cal.Rptr. 437 
(1967); People v. Hhite, 69 Cal.2d 751, 72 Cal.Rptr. 873, 446 P.2d 
993 (1968); People v. Ellingsen, 258 Cal.App.2d 535, 67 Cal.RPtr. 
744 (1968); Myers v. State, 2 lid.App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968); 
People V. P.' 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255 (1967); 
People v. Williams, 56 Misc.2d 837, 290 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1968). 
The court in People v. Arnold, supra, while holding the 
Miranda rules inapplicable because the trial had taken olace prior 
to the Miranda decision, adopted the Miranda definition of "custodial 
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interrogation." The Court stated that "custodial interrogation" 
occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of ac: 
in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable ners. 
that he is so deprived. Applying that definition, the Court heJ~ 
that the defendant might have reasonably believed that she had no 
alternative but to comply with a deputy district attorney's author 
itative summoning for interrogation at his office. Similarly, 
the defendant may reasonably have believed that if she would have 
attempted to leave during the interrogation, she would have been 
detained. The Court, therefore, ruled statements made by the de fen· 
dant on that occasion to be inadmissible. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Kelly was summoned in the middle o' 
the night to his door and informed by the nolice officer twice 
that he was investigating a homicide and had followed footprints 
from the scene of the crime to his house. Knowing that no one e~s; 
was in his house, the defendant could reasonably conclude that he 
was a suspect in a homicide investigation and as such was not free 
to leave. This reasonable belief was compounded by two more office: 
entering, neither of whom asked permission but simnly walked into 
his house (T. 196). 
Interrogations of suspects at their own residences have bee'. 
held to be "custodial interrogations" requiring Miranda warnings ar .. 
guidelines in several cases. 
In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 22 L.Ed. 2d 311, 89 S.Ct 
1095 (1969), the Court emphasized the absolute necessity for office· 
interrogating people in custody to give the Miranda warnings. In 
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~· supra, the defendant had been interrogated in his own bed-
room by police officers. Rejecting the argument that the Miranda 
warnings were not applicable because the suspect had been inter-
rogated in his own bedroom amidst familiar surroundings, the Court 
stressed the fact that the suspect was not free to leave, and was 
interrogated in the middle of the night. The Miranda opinion 
declared, the Court said, that the warnings were required where 
the person being interrogated was in custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any way. 
Similarly the Court in Rosario v. Guam, 391 F.2d 869 (9th 
Cir. 1968), held that questioning by a civil connnissioner of a sus-
pect in his own house was "custodial interrogation" and Miranda 
applied. In Rosario, supra, the Court found that the connnissioner 
had acted in his official capacity as a peace officer. The state 
contended that the questioning had been merely incidental to a social 
visit by the commissioner. The Court stated that it is not necessary 
for one to be handcuffed or even to be told that he is under arrest 
to be in custody. It is enough, the Court stated, that the susnect's 
freedom of movement, at the time of questioning, is restricted in a 
significant way by the presence of civil authority. 
In State v. Anderson, 102 Ariz. 295, 428 P.2d 672 (1967) a 
deputy sheriff's failure to give Miranda warnings before interro-
gating the defendant in her own home was held to be improper. The 
Court noted that the suspect would not have been free to leave 
because "she was obviously the suspect of an apparent murder which 
the sheriff's office was investigating." The Court found the state-
ments inadmissible and remanded the case for a new trial. 
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In People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 4~1 
(1966), the Court applied the test of "custodial interrogation" t: 
a situation where police officers questioned the defendant at an 
apartment where the defendant was temporarily living with otherc 
The police had reason to believe that the apartment was a base ' 
"illegal narcotic trade." The Court stated that police question-
ing of a person, whereever detained, unon whom suspicion has 
already focused, is ''custodial interrogation" under Miranda. The 
question was whether this was really a routine investigation or 
aimed at eliciting a confession or admission. 
Another case is particularly similar to the case at bar. 
In Windsor v. United States, 389 F. 2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), two F:: 
agents had obtained from the defendant's accomplice facts as to h~ 
a crime had ~een committed and the defendant's involvement. The 
agents questioned the defendant in his motel room shortly there-
after. The FBI agents did not tell the defendant he was under 
arrest or that he was a suspect. At the conclusion of the questi~· 
ing, the defendant waa placed under arrest. The Court found that 
the focus of the investigation had clearly and unmistakably centert 
upon the defendant, and that, in effect he had been in custodv or 
deprived of his freedom in a significant way. The statements made 
by the defendant were suppressed because the principles of 
Miranda "could not be so easily frustrated" by withholding from 
the defendant the fact that he was a suspect. There is no doubt 
that the defendant in this case was the focus of the homicide 
investigation. The Miranda decision, Miranda v. United States, 
supra, defined the focus test of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. -
l~ L Ed. 2d 977, 84 S .Ct. 1758 (1964), as "questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custoJy or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
·,i,;nificant way." (Emphasis added.) 
The question as to whether or not suspicion has focused on 
rt particular suspect can be a critical factor in determining 
'.vhether an interrogation is custodial. In State v. Largo, 24 Utah 
430, 473 P.2d 895 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court found it to be 
such a factor. In that case, the issue was whether general 
questioning of students by school officials as to the circum-
stances of an assault was custodial. Holding that this interro-
gation was not custodial the Court stated, "There was no evidence 
as to ~ specific accusations directed specifically toward one 
Eerson . . . There was no evidence of focusing the inquiry on any 
particular suspect, as in the Escobedo sense." t,73 P. 2d at 896. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, Appellant was from the outset asked 
the highly incriminating question, "Have you killed anyone tonight?" 
indicating clearly that the focus of this homicide investigation 
was centered on Appellant. 
Another factor in determining whether or not an interro-
gation is custodial is whether or not the police at the time of the 
questioning have probable cause to arrest. State v. Kennedy, 166 
Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d 508 (1977). The quantum of information which 
constitutes probable cause to arrest was defined in iiong Sun v. 
United States, supra, as "the amount of evidence which would warrant 
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a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a felony has been 
conuni tted by the person to be arrested" (quoting Carro 11 v. Unite: 
~' 267 U.S. 132, 162, 691 L.Ed. 543, 555, 45 S.Ct. 280 (19~j 
Several cases have dealt with footprints in the snow as , 
basis for probable cause. State v. Meunier, 137 Vt. 586, 409 A. 
583 (1979), concerned a single track of footprints leading from t~ 
scene of a crime to a garage. The Court found that this evidence 
was probable cause that the Derson responsible for the crime had 
fled into the garage. (The police, however, did not go into the 
garage but rather into one of three apartments with access to the 
garage and their entry was deemed illegal.) See also Soears v. 
State, 383 N .Ed. 2d 282 (Ind. 1978) (fact that there was only one 
set of footprints in the snow leading away from the scene of a 
crime and prints led to house where defendant was residing pro-
vided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.) 
Whether or not this Court finds that the officers in this 
case had probable cause to arrest the Appellant and irrespective 
of what point in time this quantum of evidence was nresent or not 
present, it is the position of the defense that Mr. Kelly was sub-
ject to custodial interrogation from the time Officer Farnsworth firs 
entered his residence, since probable cause to arrest is only one 
fact in determining whether an interrogation is custodial. 
Would Officer Farnsworth have gone away if the Appellant 
had refused him entrance to the residence or would all the officers 
have left the premises at any point if the Defendant had asked ther 
to? Certainly not (T. 198-199). These officers had "found their 
man" and their purpose was to get him to confess his guilt desnitc 
his constitutional right not to do so. 
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The officers' further purpose was to gather evidence from 
the Appellant necessary to convict him. From the time Officer 
Farnsworth first entered the apartment until he read the Appellant 
11is Miranda rights, the only information he got from the Appellant 
was exculpatory. The Appellant, as he had a right to do, simply 
did not answer some of the questions asked of him (E.G., "Have you 
killed or assaulted anyone?") (T. 209). The only additional nosi-
tive evidence the officer obtained after his initial entry and 
view of the Appellant and the mis-described ski parka on the couch 
were the Appellant's shoes, and these shoes were not really addi-
tional evidence. Even before his entry the officer had probable 
cause that they would be in the house since the prints from them 
appeared to enter the apartment by the only door. Any additional 
"evidence" coming from the Defendant not answering the officer's 
questions or giving "unsatisfactory" answers was merely cumulative 
and could not in itself establish probable cause. 
POINT III 
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT AFTER HE WAS 
READ HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
BECAUSE THE APPELLANT NEVER WAIVED HIS MIRANDA 
RIGHTS. 
The waiver of Miranda rights as well as all other consti-
tutional rights must be a knowing, intelligent waiver and the pro-
secutor has the burden of proving "an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, at 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1933). The 
waiver, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 60 L.Ed. 286, 99 
S Ct. 1755 (1979), cannot be presumed from silence. Miranda v. 
Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 724. In Edwards v. 
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Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981) ~ 
~·(U.S.) 69 L.Ed.2d 984, 101 S.Ct. 3128, the United States 
Supreme Court repeated the standard of waiver as a ·~nowing and 
intelligent relinquishment of a known right," and found that 
this relinquishment would not be lightly inferred, at 391. 
Mr. Kelly was asked if he wanted to relinquish his rights. 
Specifically he was asked twice if he wanted to answer some 
questions. Twice he answered, "I don't know." (T. 208, 209). He 
was told by the police officer that his answer "was not the right 
answer," (T. 209), whereu-pon with no further inquiry, the 
officer proceded with his questioning ("Were you at the house 
tonight?" "What were you wearing?" [T. 209]). This did not con-
stitute a valid waiver under any standard. Just as a valid waiver 
cannot be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after 
warnings are given, it cannot be presumed simply from the fact 
that a confession, or in this case statements, were in fact even-
tually obtained. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 
L.Ed.2d 724. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
THAT THE APPELLANT HAD COMMITTED A CRIME AND 
THAT HIS CLOTHING WAS EVIDENCE OF THAT CRIME, 
THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO SEIZE THE CLOTHING (SHOES, 
PANTS, AND GLOVES) WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT· 
There was nothing about the Defendant's shoes, pants, and 
gloves at the time they were seized by the police officers to 
indicate that they were evidence of a crime. Such evidence was 
discovered only after the items were seized and insnected by the 
officers. 
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Warrantless Searches 
The Supreme Court of the United States has time and again 
held that police may not conduct a search unless they first procure 
;; warrant from a neutral magistrate. The Court in Katy v. United 
~· 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967), 
held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically-established 
and well-delineated exceptions. The Court places the burden on 
the party seeking an exemption from the constitutional mandate to 
prove the circumstances of the situation made the warrantless search 
imperative. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
(The burden is on prosecution to justify search or seizure without 
warrant, People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1142 ~~rt. den. 93 S.Ct. 
1382 (1972). The Court has continually stressed that these "excep-
tions" are few and are jealously and carefully drawn. Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 68 L.Ed.2d 38, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (1981); 
Arkansas v. Saunders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 231, 99 S. 
Ct. 2586 (1979). 
The first of these exceptions is search incident to arrest 
This exception was carved out by the court in Chimel v. California, 
394 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969), and later 
modified in Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 61 L.Ed.2d 2, 
627 (1979). These decisions give an officer authority to search a 
person legally arrested. The scope of the search extends to the 
person and the limited area within the control of the person arrested. 
These cases contemplate a search for weapons or evidentiary items 
1-1hich the arrested person might con.ceal or destroy. If the officers 
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in this case did not have probable casue to arrest Ronald Kelly, 
then arresting him without a warrant was illegal and anything seiz 
in a search incident to an illegal arrest is inadmissable. If t~, 
officers did have probable cause to arrest Ronald Kelly and had i 
fact arrested him, they only had the right to search his person 
and areas within his immediate control, contemporaeously with the 
arrest.. Shipley v. California, 394 U.S. 818, 23 L.Ed.2d 732, 89 
S.Ct. 2053 (1969). Mr. Kelly was in his living room when Office' 
Farnsworth informed him that he would "have to" (emphasis added) 
come with him to talk to detectives concerning this homicide. If 
this was the point and time of the arrest, the officers had no 
legal authority to search other rooms of his house as incident to 
his arrest. They only had the right to search his person and the 
area within his control. Since there were three officers present 
at this time, there was no reasonable possibility that he could o' 
would conceal or destroy evidence or weapons in other parts of the 
house before he w~s placed in the police vehicle outside his 
residence. 
The second exception to the search warrant requirement for 
searches is the "exigent circumstances" exception. Exigent circuo· 
stances are said to exist when immediate police action is required 
to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to 
forestall the likely escape of a suspect on the threatened removal 
or destruction or evidence. State v. Dorson, 614 P.2d 740 (Ha. 
1980); State v. Trijillo, 624 P.2d 44 (N.M. 1981); State v. Turchil 
632 P.2d 497 (Ore. App. 1981). 
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Once Officer Farnsworth had observed Ronald Kelly in 
his shorts, without a weapon, and had entered his residence,no 
other exigent circumstances existed for a search. There was no 
longer any reasonable possibility of danger to life, oronerty, 
or the destruction of evidence and the exigent circumstances/ 
hot pursuit exception could not be used to justify a search of 
the Defendant's house for physical evidence of the crime the 
officers were investigating. 
Sometimes the exigent circumstances exceotion is used 
to justify a protective sweep of all or oart of a residence 
when officers have a reasonable belief that other persons are 
present on the premises and that such persons might nose a 
danger to officers or might destroy evidence. A nrerequisite 
for such a protective sweep is that police have grounds to 
believe that other Potentially dangerous persons are oresent. 
If the officers in this case had reasonably believed that other 
persons might be present they would certainly have looked for 
such persons when they entered the Appellant's residence rather 
than waiting until they were about to leave. 
In Gagliano v. State, 629 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1981), the 
Nevada court held that police officers were not justified in a 
warrantless intrusion into another room of an apartment where 
a defendant was arrested in order to check for a possible wrong 
doer where defendant clad only in underpants was in full view 
when the officers entered. 
Another exception to the warrant requirement is the 
plain view exception. This exception holds that items which 
are in plain view or sight at the time of a oolice interrogation are 
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subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence. Harris 
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069, 88 
S.Ct. 992 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43, 10 L.Ed 
2d 726, 743, 83 S.Ct. 1623 (1963); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 446, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971). 
The plain view doctrine however requires more than a prior justi-
fication for intrusion into an otherwise protected area. There 
must also be an immediate connection between the object and 
criminal activity, to-wit; probable cause. Plain view seizure 
is limited to items that are clearly incriminating. United 
States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1978). In addition, 
the Coolidge, supra case requires that a nlain view discovery 
must also be inadvertent. The defense maintains that the 
"discovery" of the Defendant's shoes, pants, and gloves does not 
fall within this plain view exception. 
In the case of the shoes, Officer Farnsworth did not 
have a right to enter the Defendant's bedroom. If the Apoellant 
was not in custody the officer could not legally follow him 
around his house. If the Apnellant was in custody, the of~icer 
could not interrogate him about what he was wearing without 
informing him of his Miranda rights and could not use answers 
given as a result of an illegal interrogation to gain probable 
cause and obtain thereby a plain view observation of the 
Appellant's shoes. The same would hold true for the Appellant's 
pants. They were not clearly incriminating (they were black 
and no blood stains on them were observed until after they were 
seized and sent to the FBI.) They only became incriminating 
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after the Appellant admitted wearing them that night, an 
admission made as a result of custodial interrogation but with-
out a valid waiver of Miranda rights. On the other hand, if 
the officers did not have probable cause to believe Appellant had 
committed a crime, they had no probable cause to believe his pants 
were evidence of that crime even if the pants were in Plain 
view in the bedroom. The police officer who seized the Appel-
lant's gloves did so during a search for "other persons" in 
the Defendant's bathroom. The Appellant maintains that this 
search for "other persons" was merely a subterfuge for an illegal 
warrantless search of the Defendant's Premises after he had 
been taken into custody. The discovery of the gloves was not 
inadvertent as required by Coolidge, supra, but rather the 
result of a search based on the pretext of a protective sweep 
which was not reasonably necessary. If a legal search for one 
item is merely a pretext to search for something else, the 
search may be invalidated. State v. Lair, 630 P.2d 427 (Wash. 
1981). Searching the bathroom and finding gloves while claim-
ing to be looking for a Person is not an inadvertent discovery, 
especially in view of the dely in conducting that search and in 
view of the fact that the gloves themselves were not obviously 
contraband, stolen goods, or objects dangerous in themselves. 
Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 472, 29 L.Ed.2d at 537. The gloves 
were located on the bathroom floor and the stains on them were 
not apparent until they were illegally seized by the officer. 
Thus,none of the items (shoes, gloves, pants) come within the 
plain view exception. 
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The last exception to the warrant requirement which 
might pertain to this case is that of a valid consent to search. 
Officer Farnsworth was asked at the Preliminary Hearing of 
this case if the Defendant consented to a search of his house 
or seizure of anything. Officer Farnsworth testified that he 
did not (PH 195). The United States Supreme Court has held 
that the mere acquiesence to the authority of the police is 
not consent and conduct which indicates only acquiesence of 
perceived police authority, as in this case, will not sunnort 
a search based on consent regardless of the lack of overt 
coercion. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d 
797, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (1968). 
Mr. Kelly did not consent to other officers entering 
his premises after the entry of Officer Farnsworth. He did not 
consent to having any of his personal property seized. Even 
if the officers had probable cause to search for evidence in 
this case, probable cause in itself does not justify a warrant-
less search. State v. Spietz, 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975). 
The shoes, pants, and gloves seized in this case do not fall 
within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. They 
were seized illegally and should not have been admissible at 
Mr. Kelly's trial under the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1089-1090, 81 S.Ct. 1684 
(1961). 
POINT V 
STATEMENTS MADE AND EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A 
RESULT OF THE VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S 
FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED UNDER THE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS 
TREE DOCTRINE . 
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\Vithout waiving his Miranda rights, the Appellant was 
asked a number of questions including the questions about what 
he had been wearing. Without being informed of his right to 
remain silent he answered many of these questions, and indi-
cated a Pair of shoes, a pair of Pants, and a pair of gloves, 
all of which the officers illegally seized. The State sought 
to use the answers he gave and the clothing he indicated 
against him. This is specifically what the exclusionary rule 
says the State may not do. 
The fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine prohibits 
the government from using against the accused information derived 
from facts learned as a result of the unlawful acts of govern-
ment agents. Wong Sun v. United States, sunra, 371 U.S. 471, 9 
L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); and Fahy v. Conneticut, 375 
U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229 (1963). After Placing the 
Defendant under arrest and taking him to the nolice car the 
officers continued to ask him questions without any waiver of 
his Miranda rights. 
Euen if some of these statements are found to be 
voluntary and the product of a waiver of his Miranda rights, 
they were.at their root, induced by the APpellant's being con-
fronted with information learned and evidence seized as a 
result of the unlawful acts of the police and must be suppressed 
under the poisonous tree doctrine, ~· 
Items seized pursuant to the search warrants issued 
after the Appellant was taken into custody must also be sup-
oressed because the probable cause for issuance of these warrants 
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was obtained in violation of the Defendant's Miranda rights 
and his Fourth Amendment ri~hts against illegal searches and 
seizures. All three search warrants in this case purport to 
base the probable cause for their issuance on the shoes of 
the Defendant with soles matching the footprints leading frol'l 
the scene of the crime, and bearing blood stains, The soles 
were observed only after the shoes were seized, and at the 
time of the preparation of the search warrant there had been 
no analysis of any clothing to determine if blood existed there. 
The Appellant maintains that under no theorv were these shoes 
legally observed and seized. Thus, the evidence seized nur-
suant to search warrants which have as their probable cause 
the shoes, and conclusionary officers' statements, must also 
be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, 
supra. 
POINT VI 
THERE I.JERE NO EXIGENT CIRC~STN!CES TO JUSTIFY 
Till: WARRANTLESS SEARCH A.I'm "rnPOUNDME'lT" OF 
THE APPELLANT"S RESIDE:lCE AFTER HIS ARREST. 
AS A RESULT, THE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED SEARCH 
WARRANTS FOR THAT RESIDENCE, EVEN IF 
FOUND TO BE BASED ON LEGALLY-OBTAINED PRO-
BABLE CAUSE, DID NOT CURE THE ORIGINAL ILLEGAL 
ENTRY AND IMPOUNDMENT BY "SECURING" OFFICERS 
WITH VIDEO EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, ALL EVIDENCE 
SEIZED PURSUANT TO THOSE SEARCH WARRANTS MUST 
BE SUPPRESSED. 
In State v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1980), the 
Hawaiian Supreme Court held that "the warrantless securing or 
impounding of a house, where otherwise invalid (not based on 
exigent circumstances) cannot be validated by the fact that no 
comprehensive search was made and no evidence seized until a 
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until a search warrant arrived. The State must show exigent cir-
cumstances existing at the time of entry and impoundment if the 
warrantless securing of premises by the police is to be sustained. 
Absent such exigent circumstances, the right to search or seize 
is to be determined by a judicial officer and not by a policeman. 
The Court found that police officers securing premises while 
waiting for a search warrant to arrive amounted to a seizure of 
the house and its contents. Likewise in People v. Shuey, 120 
Cal.Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211 (1975), the California Supreme Court 
held that the occupation of a defendant's house by the police 
while they were waiting for a search warrant amounted to an 
illegal seizure, that securing of premises is itself a seizure 
which cannot be validated by a subsequent warrant, because the 
property has already been seized. 
The Washington Supreme Court made a similar finding in 
State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978). In that 
case the defendant was legally arrested for a narcotics violation 
and his vehicle searched. Based on illegal drugs found in the 
defendant's vehicle, the police sought a search warrant for his 
residence. Prior to obtaining the warrant officers who had the 
residence under surveillance were ordered to secure the house. 
They entered it and observed marijuana in plain view. The Court 
held that the "securing of the house" could not be based on 
exigent circumstances even though other persons were present on 
the premises and suppressed all evidence obtained from the house 
whether it was seized before o~ after the search warrant was 
served. The Court held that the initial entry into the house was 
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wrongful and the subsequently obtained search warrant did not 
cure the original illegal entry. In this case before the Court, 
the only legal entry into the residence of 637 Brixen Court was 
made by Officer Farnsworth. There was no consent to the entrv 
of Officers Martin and Bernard and no consent to Officer Bernar,l 
remaining to secure the premises and admitting technician CoHley 
into the premises to video tape the front room and two purses in 
the closet Certainly after Ronald Kelly was removed from the 
premises there was no threat of the destruction of evidence and 
thus no exigent circumstances for the seizure of his house for 
five hours until the first search warrant was served. 
POINT VII 
POLICE ACTING PURSUA."lT TO A SEARCH WARRANT FOR 
BLOOD AND/OR SEMEN STAINED CLOTHING AND A 
BLOOD STAINED SHOELACE COULD NOT LEGALLY SEIZE 
OTHER ITEMS NOT OBVIOUSLY CONTRABAND , IN STRU-
MENTALITIES, OR EVIDENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC CRIME 
AND ANY SUCH EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED. 
The law requires a nexus between an item to be seized, 
criminal behavior, and a place to be searched. Probable cause 
necessary to seize a particular item must be examined in terms 
of "cause to believe that the evidence sought will be at the 
place to be searched and a particular aporehension or conviction " 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 793, 87 S.Ct. 
1642 (1967). This nexus requirement fulfulls the the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of particularity. Hithout such a require-
ment, police could seize an item on pure speculation. The lead-
ing Fourth Amendment case dealing with this issue was Coolid1Se v. 
New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 202: 
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(1971). In that case, the Supreme Court recognized two histor-
ical reasons for the search warrant's requirement: 1) to elim-
inate searches not based on probable cause and 2) to avoid the 
specific evil of the "general warrant"--an exploratory rummaging 
in a person's belongings by requiring a particular description 
of things to be seized. 403 U.S. at 467, 29 L.Ed.2d at 583. 
the Coolidge case also required that the incriminating nature of 
articles seized must be immediately apparent. 403 U.S. at 466, 
29 L.Ed.2d at 583. 
The following cases have involved searches pursuant to 
warrants where evidence not named in the warrant was suppressed 
because its incriminating nature was not immediately apparent. 
In Nunes v. Superior Court, 100 Cal.App. 3d 915 (1980), 
the California Appeals Court held that officers could not seize 
articles on the general suspicion that they may coincide with 
descriptions of stolen property contained in police reports not 
in their possession, citing Warden v. Hayden, supra, The Court 
held: 
The plain view doctrine does not justify the 
seizure pursuant to a search warrant of items 
not named in a search warrant which the police 
believe matched articles described in police 
reports. While officers may seize articles 
not named in a warrant which are reasonably 
identifiable as contraband, police officers 
are foreclosed from seizing items indiscrimin-
ately. They must demonstrate that a nexus 
exists between the item to be seized and 
criminal behavior. 
In the case of People v. Murry, 77 Cal.Aon. 3d 305, 143 
Cal.Rptr. 502 (1978), officers entered premises pursuant to a 
search warrant for narcotics and observed 67 television sets, 
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twenty of which had their serial numbers removed. They seized 
two of these sets. The Court rejected the contention that this 
evidence justified seizure under plain view standards, finding 
that the television sets were not inherently identifiable as 
contraband. Other cases have had similar holdings. See 
Corrnnonwealth v. Hawkins, 280 N .E. 2d 665 (Mass. 1972) (government 
bonds with name other than occupant's were unconnected with 
narcotic crime and police could not seize them momentarily to 
ascertain whether or not they had been stolen); Anderson v. 
State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976) (with a search warrant for 
marijuana, police could not seize slides which when held uo to 
the light depicted nude male children); State v. Keefe, 537 P.2d 
795 (Wash.App. 1975) (Officer with search warrant for gun could 
not take "i" and "e" letters from a typewriter as "possible" 
evidence in a forgery case.) 
State v. Shinault, 120 Ariz. 213, 584 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 
App. 1978), held that pursuant to a search warrant for narcotics 
and illegal firearms, police could not seize from inside a box 
an outwardly innocuous bound columnar pad containing inside 
the first names of the defendants and entries referring to "dollar: 
and pounds." The court in that case found that while the officers 
had a right to look in the box for narcotics, once they looked and 
recognized it contained nothing but papers, the search was no 
longer for narcotics and firearms, but rather for written records, 
not listed in the search warrant. 
In the case before this Court, the officers seized many 
items for which they had no authority. (See Appendix A) 
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Specifically, the defense questions the seizure of various 
purses, a toilet token, a red nipple stuffed with cotton, a 
bed sheet, a bed cover, a blue and white sweater, and "miscel-
laneous papers" and maintains that the seizure of these items 
was illegal. Even if the officers had a right to look in the 
purses for blood and semen-stained clothing, or a blood-stained 
shoelace, when they saw that these items were not present, they 
had no right to further examine the purses or to seize them. 
They had no probable cause that these items were contraband, 
merely a suspicion that it was unusual for the Defendant to 
have them in his possession as in the cases cited above. 
The defense also questions what nexus a toilet token, 
a red nipple, a bed cover and sheet, a red scarf with knot, and 
a blue and while sweater might have to any specific crime. The 
seizure of the last item mentioned inthe search warrant return, 
"miscellaneous papers," is the final proof that these officers 
considered themselves to be on a general treasure hunt and not 
in anyway bound by the confine of the Fourth Amendment. This 
search took place before May 1, 1982, and, therefore, no inquiry 
is necessary into whether these officers abrogated the consti-
tution in good faith. 
It must also be pointed out that the wrong address 
appears en one of the three search warrants and the correction 
had no indication of when or who made such. (See Appendix A). 
It is clear, therefore, that the three search warrants were 
based on insufficient, conclusionary language of officers who 
did not have sufficient foundational facts to make them. 
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Additionally, these search 1varrants were based on illegally-
seized articles and gave the magistrate the erroneous impres-
sion that these illegally-seized articles were still in the 
place to be searched when they had already been taken out of 
the house when Appellant was taken to jail. 
POINT VIII 
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION DUE TO THE FAILURE TO 
HOLD THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION WITHIN 10 
DAYS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§77-35-7(c) (1953 AS AME~lDED) 
On February 11, 1982, the Information charging Mr. Kelly 
was filed and signed by Judge Grant of the Circuit Court. Mr. 
Kelly had been and was in custody at the time of the issuance of 
the Information. 
On February 12, 1984, the Defendant/Appellant was 
arraigned and a Preliminary Hearing was set for March 5, 1982, at 
the hour of 9:30 a.m., in front of the Honorable Judge Gibson, 
Fifth Circuit Court Judge. There was no waiver of the time 
limits prescribed in §77-35-7(c) by Mr. Kelly. 
On March 5, 1982, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the DefendMt 
was present, with counsel, prepared to proceed. The prosecution 
was not prepared and, over the Defendant's objection, the Prelim-
inary Hearing was continued to March 24, 1982, at the hour of 
9:30 a.rn. in front of Judge Jones, Fifth Circuit Court Judge. 
On the afternoon of March 23, 1982, Mr. Kelly's counsel 
received, over the telephone, the message that the Preliminary 
Hearing had been re-set for April 5, 1982, without the benefit of 
any hearing on the matter nor with the consent of either the 
State or Mr. Kelly. 
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On April 5, 1982, Mr. Kelly, by and through his attorneys 
of record, moved to dismiss the Information based unon the viola-
tion of Mr. Kelly's rights as expressed in Utah Code Annotated, 
§77-35-7(c) (1953 as amended). 
The violation of §77-35-7(c) deprived Mr. Kelly of a sub-
stantial statutory and constitutional right, the remedy for which is 
dismissal of the Information. Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-7(c) 
states, in pertinent part: 
. If the defendant does not waive a 
preliminary examination, the magistrate 
shall schedule the preliminary examination. 
Such examination shall be held within a 
reasonable time, but in any event not 
later than 30 days if he is not in custody; 
provided, however, that these time oeriods 
may be extended by the magistrate for good 
cause shown . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
The statute stated above was obviously violated in Mr. 
Kelly's case and such a viol~tion requires dismissal of the Infor-
mation. There was no good cause showing by anyone to establish 
the basis for the original setting being beyond the 10-day limit. 
Further, there was absolutely no showing for the unacceotable delay 
between March 24 and April 5, 1982. There was, indeed, no hearing 
so that such a showing could be attemoted. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting a closely aligned 
statute concerning 90-day disposition requests stated the issue was 
one of jurisdiction. See State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (1974). The 
Utah Supreme Court went on to state that an Information, filed too 
late, deprived the courts of the jurisdictions to hear such a 
complaint, and that the devise, atternoted to be used by the prose-
cution, of dismissing the complaint and filing a new complaint could 
not be used and was a violation of the 90-day detainer statute. 
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Mr. Kelly's position is that the time limits expressed in 
§77-35-7(c) are jurisdictional in nature and if the Circuit Court 
violates those time limits, absent "good cause" or a showing of 
good cause and hearing ordered to question such cause, the court 
looses jurisdiction of the case created by that Information, and 
the Information must, therefore, be dismissed. 
In the case of Morton v. Supreme Court, 411 P.2d 170 
(1966 Arizona), the Arizona Supreme Court granted Mr. Morton's 
request for dismissal based upon the fact that the Defendant's 
speedy trial rights (i.e., trial within 60 days) were violated. 
The Arizona Court was viewing their case in light of the delay in 
trial and the statute which allows only sixty days in which to 
try a defendant. The language of Rule 236 of the Arizona statute 
is almost identical to our §77-35-7(c) which aoplies to preliminarv 
hearings. The Arizona Court stated: 
It does not seem that constitutional 
and statutory rights of a person charged with 
crime should be made dependent upon the amount 
of business in the court or the number of jury 
cases at issue. If so, what would be good 
cause for delay would mean one thing in those 
counties with little litigation and another 
thing in those where the litigation requires 
the frequent attendance of trial juries. In 
Hernandez v. State [40 Ariz. 200, 11 P.2d 356] 
we held that the . . . personal comfort and 
convenience of the court and jury should not 
be permitted to nullify the laws passed for 
the protection of accused oersons. If the 
delay in bringing on the trial is not attri-
butable to ~me act of accused, the statute is 
imperative in its provisions, and the court 
has no alternative but to dismiss the pro-
secution. 
P.2d at 966. 
See also Reason v. Sheriff of Clark Countv, 579 P. 2d 781 (1978 Neva' 
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The Information filed against Mr. Kelly must be dismissed 
due to the statutory and constitutional rights violated by the un-
reasonable and unexplained delay of Mr. Kelly's right to a Prelim-
inary Hearing within 10 days of his arraignment in Circuit Court. 
ilr. Kelly was in custody on February 10, 1982, and remains so to 
this day. There was no good cause shown for any of the delays 
involved in getting Mr. Kelly to Preliminary Hearing and, therefore, 
based upon the case law and statutory requirements this Informa-
tion should have been dismissed. 
POINT IX 
IT WAS ERROR NOT TO GRANT THE APPELLANT'S 
TIMELY MOTION TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED AGAINST APPELLA_f\JT. 
On February 10, 1982, Mr. Kelly was arrested for the death 
of Carla Taylor. At the autopsy, "some hairs from the right 
buttock," (T. 342) of the victim were located and retrieved by the 
pathologists assigned to the case. Of the hairs thereon located, 
the law enforcement agency involved sent all of those hairs for 
testing to the FBI in Washington D.C. These hairs were anlayzed by 
the FBI, along with one known sample from Mr. Kelly's pubic area 
obtained by search warrant. 
Mr. Malan, of the FBI testified at the Preliminary Hearing 
that subsequent to his anaylsis of "one hair" found on the buttocks 
of the victim and the known sample of pubic hair taken from ~r. 
Kelly: 
This pubic hair microscopically matches the 
the pubic hair of Mr. Kelly. Therefore, this 
particular pubic hair either originated from 
Mr. Kelly ... to havec:ome from anybody 
else but Mr. Kelly, it would have to be a 
person of the negroid race. 
(PH. 529) 
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Mr. Malan went on to state his opinion that one of the hairs 
collected form the "right buttocks" of the victim was from Mr. 
Kelly or someone who exhibited the same characteristics of Mr. 
Kelly's hair (T. 529). 
The vaginal area of the victim was described by the 
medical examiner, Dr. Ryser, as follows: 
Q: Dr. Ryser, you say you can't rule out rave? 
A: That is right, I can't 
Q: Even though there's no semen or seminal 
fluid found in the vagina? 
A: That's right. 
Q: Even though there was no bruising around 
the opening to the vagina? I'm sure there's 
a medical name for that, but I'm not familar 
with it. 
A: That's right. There was no such bruising. 
Q: You can't, however, rule our the nossibility 
that there was no rape; correct? 
A: I can't rule that out either. 
Q: You can't say one way or the other, can you? 
A: I can't 
(T. 348) 
There was no evidence of any forced sexual assault, seminal fluid, 
sperm, or foreign pubic hairs on victim's pubic region (T.351), nor 
whether the bruised regions hanpened before or after death (T. 353) 
Indeed, the prosecutor asked the pathologist whether or not a 
forced sexual assault could occur but leave no visible marks or 
injuries on the body (T. 347). 
Such a question was asked based upon the absence of 
factual substantiation for the aggravating circumstances alleged in 
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this homicide case. After an entire reading of the trial trans-
cript, it is clear that there was insufficient evidence to convict 
r!r. Kelly of a homicide alleging special circumstances of "raoe, 
Jnd/or aggravated sexual assault." 
It is the position of the Appellant that the existence of 
one pubic hair, described to be similar to Mr. Kelly's on the right 
buttocks of the victim, along with two other hairs not associated 
<Jith Mr. Kelly is insufficient as a matter of law and fact, to sub-
stantiate the aggravating circumstance of attempted rape, rape, 
and/or aggravated sexual assault. 
There was a toothbrush inserted in the vagina but as this 
court is well aware, in Utah, there was at the time of this offense 
no rape by device, nor is the charge of forcible sexual abuse one 
of the numerated aggravating circumstances under Utah Code Annotated 
§76-5-202 (a)- (h) (1953 as amended). 
No Appellant, including Mr. Kelly, should be held to stand 
trial on a death penalty case, made so by the use of alleged aggra-
vating circumstances, unless those circumstances have relevant evi-
dence that is substantial and of such a convincing quality that it 
could support a conclusion by reasonable minds that the Defendant 
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mr. Kelly respectfully maintains that the trial court 
erred as a matter of applicable law and fact in finding him guilty 
of the First Degree Homicide with the aggravating circumstances of 
attempted rape, rape, and/or aggravated sexual assault. That the 
amount and quality of evidence pertaining to the alleged aggravating 
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circumstances (i.e., one pubic hair on right buttocks) was and is 
totally insufficient to sustain said aggravating circumstances. 
and that, therefore, such circumstances should have been dismisse~ 
(T. 586, 704). See Jaramillo v. State, 517 P.2d 490 (Hvo. 1974). 
POINT X 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND 
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
OF FIRST DEGREE HOMICIDE, A CAPITAL OFFENSE 
In State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 442 (1983), this Court stated 
notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's 
decision this Court still has the right to review the sufficiencv 
of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the Court noted, 
"We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence (seen in the light most favorable to the verdict) is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." (citations omitteC• 
Finally, the dissent in State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 299 (1980) noted, 
"If the circumstances essential for conviction are ambiguous and 
consistent with the innocence of the accused, then this Court must 
hold, as a matter of law, that there is no substantial evidence to 
support the guilt of the accused." Id. at 234-5. 
Viewed against this background, the evidence to support 
the conviction for First Degree Homicide, a Capital Offense is foun: 
to be lacking. 
At trial, the evidence indicated that the victim was kill~ 
in her apartment while her two children slept in the back bedroom 
(T. 100). That the victim's apartment had three entrances, two of 
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which were locked at the time of the homicide (T.223-224). The 
one entrance leading not into a common hallway but directly into 
the apartment of Jerome Thorton was locked only from Mr. Thorton's 
apartment and could not be locked from the victim's apartment 
(T.223-224, 307). Jerome Thorton, the black neighbor of the 
victim, was at hol'le the evening of the homicide. The officers 
talked to him during the early morning hours of February 10, 1982, 
(T. 306). Mr. Thorton had been in the victil'l 's apartment and 
has also been extremely angry with her due to the fact that she 
had called the police on him when he had been physically abusing 
his former live-in roomate, Darla Cates (T.153, 225, 304). 
It was further learned that Jerome Thorton had not 
answered the door when the Appellant had attemnted to use his 
phone to call a taxi in the early morning hours of February 10, 
1982. Also, Jerome Thorton was a convicted felon who had been 
convicted, among other offenses, of aggravated assault on a 
female with a tire iron (T.310). It was also learned that no 
request for blood, pubic hair, or fingerprints was ever obtained 
from Mr. Thorton (T.312). 
The only factor which connected the Appellant, Mr. Kelly, 
with the crime was his presence there that morning. But Jerome 
Thorton was there as well.. Appellant had blood on his pants' 
cuff that was "consistent" with the victim's blood, but also 
consistent with twelve million other people's blood (T.473-474). 
It was never shown that the Appellant had a reason to dislike 
the victim, but Mr. Thorton was shown to have an extreme dislike 
for her (T .225). 
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The pubic hair found on the buttocks of the victim that 
was found to be consistent with Appellant's was never analyzed 
against the pubic hair of Mr. Thorton. It was later shown, 
through defense expert Dr. Birkley, that a person need not 
even be in the place a hair is found since others can transfer 
such hair through a process commonly called static electricity 
or attachment to a foreign host (T.643-646). 
Based on consideration of all the facts of this case, 
and the standards of review expressed above, the Appellant 
feels there was insufficient evidence to convict him of First 
Degree Criminal Homicide, a Capital Offense. 
There is also an extreme deficiency in proof that even 
if the Appellant had been proven to knowingly and intentionally 
have killed the victim, that such was done "while the actor was 
engaged in the commission of, or attempting to commit rape, and/ 
or aggravated sexual assault." 
The prosecution chose to charge Appellant with two acts 
(killing and raping) which were alleged to have occurred at the 
same time. There is no evidence within the voluminous records 
on appeal to which the State can point that has, in any way, 
proven the concurrent acts alleged in the Information against 
Appellant. There was, indeed, a killing; and there may have 
been an attempted rape, and/or aggravated sexual assault, but 
there is no evidence whatsoever that the killing took place 
"while," a rape or aggravated sexual assault was taking place. 
It is highly likely that the toothbrush was inserted after 
death. Indeed, the prosecutor argued that the death took place 
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because the Appellant was enraged at being denied sex, which 
was shear speculation since no witnesses existed and no nhysical 
evidence on, or in, the body in the apartment would, or in fact 
did, substantiate such a claim. 
Due to this single glaring deficiency, the aggravating 
circumstances should have been dismissed by the trial court. 
This error, added to the substantial nature of the facts argued 
above makes the decision inescapable that, at most, the Court 
could only consider Second Degree Homicide, a First Degree 
Felony, as a possible verdict against him. There was, we 
respectfully submit, insufficient evidence to convict Apoellant 
of any offense due to the nature and quantum of evidence pre-
sented by the prosecution at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The case charged against Appellant, Ronald Lemoyne Kelly, 
was serious, but the errors described above were substantial. 
Due to those errors the Appellant resnectfully requests that the 
case against him be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the 
case be remanded for a new trial as, at most, a Second Degree 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
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DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, this day of 
\ 1. 
,) 
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1 I' l''ft ".)•01_': f•11t'10r t11at thi:rc v;is ;:i l'lrind c:;n,·1r 0;1 the left 
·.1- ~ ·-1 ''" Ii f ;rnv inforrncition is obtainect from an unnamed source) 
!1·1° ·. ec-ified t:ic ~bcve infor:nation from ':he confidential infcn::'lnt 
rl =i:-::urate ~! 1 10'-..lgh the following ind~p<:ri-::~nt in·1.·estigati.on: 
·re:, ~he 0 fficint pra:·.0 chat a Search Warrant be i•' ·,,,d for the se>iz:.ire of 
1 tlie> ~ ;::i:. t·ime 
,,, rlme dc.y c_ ".i2lit because there is r<?.,:-::_:1 to belie,,,.e jt :s 
·1<c-,c1r:" to sei~= ':he property prior tc it bs:;·§: concealed, dcostr'.l\'ed. 
~c·-·;; 0 d, 0r alt?r 0 r'., or for other good r 0 ason°, to ,,-it: 
~ :- ;""""C'jUCS terl t 1 
. ,_ r;, ~ ~:? re11_1i r~d tr-
(if appropriate) the offi. 
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0 ·1~_hority or }.-'':r~~.-:r.i 
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'I 0 1-plastic bag cont: 1-rair of lt. blue boxer short'.;. 
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.>::::r: ':? c' ·.1 1.,1..f:::t:. STl.Tt Of UTAH 
'c·.· 
-~~icer in th 0 State of Ctah. 
1-=-i de 7 C' 2• -: h h a ·,,~in g been ma d '2 t ~ i s C 2 y t, e f J re rn '2 
I am sat~sfied that there is 
:ile F'ers'.Jn Is·, of 
t: he •·eh i c 1 e ( s ·, ci_e_s_c_r_:.~· _t_e_o~.-a-s------------------
,:_::-i : he '.='rei::-.::..s es VJlOWTI as ___ 6::_::3:_"_:...:3c.:t:..·::1:...:-.:-'e:::n-'---'C:.'::-'.:u:.:ro....::t _____ ~ 
:=c~'.: , Cou::ity '.Jf ::Oalt SCl.··.e 
:~~=-= :.s no·,· t·e:.ng possessed o: c::;ncealea certc.li1 
'Jrc_,:·-·:',~l~·· acq·..:i.red or is i.mla·-·ful~\· possessed. 
_ ~-=.-, ___ _ _ ::c:=nit 0r =-~nce~l ;:_ p1_··:-ilic: off-:=ns~. 
·:_:_::c: ~--ss":;sed ·,..·i.:h the i:;u~ose 1:12 use it as a mean.'.: 
·"-::::;_n; c:: c:nnce3ling a p;_,blic of;'ense. 
:~-~1s':~ r: ~~ ::.:em or cc:lstitutes e~.-i_dence of illegal cs:1duct, 
-~essed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
~··idenc~ rf ;_llegal conduct in possession of a person er 
:~':·: nc~ a rac:;· to the '..llegal conduct and good cause ':e'..n2 
; ':Lia: t~J? sei::: 1ire cannot be ob:ained b·,' su~p0ena · ... ·i.:hJ·..:.':. 
·1Ce~ce ":·::_i_nE c:onceale2. des::ra:,red, da...~ged, or a~':2:--::d 
-~,:.::.::.:.::--:: ::-:- se:-»~1ce of this · ... ·2rYan: are included er 
-.-:J:.he_j h1:r::i':.0 
. .. "h 0 c:! a-.· t l '.'l~ ~~; ci;;,'" ~~:: or night (good ca•Jse ha'--1.ug been shown) 
" x e c 'J t e ·,: ~ t ~1 c 11 t n o ti c e ::; f au t :-to r i t \' o r p u:: po s e , ( p r o : : 
'-'~' :~r o~th being sirnw"TI that :he object of this search ma:· be 
_c:f:l·: c:!est::r .. ,·e:::i c:: disposed of or that harm=:; result ::c 
r"~s:cn i; ~o:ice were gi~en) 
ccc.::c:-i cf t~e 2':-c:Ye-nawed or described pe::s::ms(s), veh1.c:le!s). 
f:~ ':he [·1e:-e1n-2bove described r:-opE~ty Or e\·idence 2..:ld i: 
'.'2."'lE 2:- a:-::·· i;a::t thereof, to bring it forth·~·ith befc:-~ c="= Cit 
~-~--'-ou:::, County of Salt La.J.:e, State of Utah, or retain 
; ~-~ ".:::·.· ic-, Your c•JStod·/, subject to the order sif this court. 
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en t'.oe persn'l(sl of 
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( '"' 
c-: ~~: 
c: -~ ':_"" t: ::'. ~. 
.. l~_r_,' .. •) ,Co·mtv 
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I' 
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'..·Jl~·. t1.cr;uircd or is \.lilla·,:f·~ll:-- ?~:::.::~sse::; 
1?-:·1 •_J'-::c:c; t') cnmmit or c2ncertl 2 P\~blic '.)ffense; 
~~-~~ ?0~s0ssed ~ith the pur?ose t0 us~ i~ as a ~eans of 
~:en:; '.H c-:·nc 0 .>ling a p,_if:>lic offense; 
·-; .... ~, ,..,~ cF: -:_te'":'": 0r constitutes e-.·iC~:tce ':'1f illegal cor.:L1(:':, 
c,cc,'"'l by :i \:'.irt'1 to the illegal cond·c:c::; 
~; .... ~ ~f ~n i:e;~ r)r constitutes e·:ide~c~ o~ illegal c0~d~c~. 
~~~·~~ by a rerson or entit·; not ~ Q2~:~- to the illega~. ccn~~ct. 
-'·T1irerwn':s of Utah Cod~ An'1o'.:.o,.:ec,- 17-23-3(2)] 
""" :Jiµ pcore>rty and evidenre descr~oec =.':iove is evidence cf th_e 
_::: 1. 1 1i:1-31 !lr'~11i~1c10 The :2c~s to establi<:i1 tJ--.2 g:-ou.t 
---::--2- ~:f:',1::-cTl \·:.:irr;int are: 
1ri, i~::~-?, 0t n338 hnJrs, p,...dir:::r: 0:::::1---::~rs •.:e:.·e c:iIJ,~: ·~c (_ 
s.11 J, l;:r City, (;t_ 3)1 I \·Jhe>r~ :-:iund t~i; b0::.l·1 ':"' f ··::::--lu 
1 '·· ::Jl'•_·r1 br:-i 1_c-i1 ,111rJ ussau l t~ci. anrl st,1~~-.,'=':i to c_1e3.th; fcJ l{Y.; 
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[r·r·>t frorn tli0 door, .1 coa.t i·.rhi~<1 ;-1;1t_checl the de~c1-jpf~-l;1 
:_llr 1 rli'.~!'1:-.:.cll•_,r; he? c»::r:iined th0 co~: etnd obser';~cl fr':'.::·11 
l···r(_,r_11~; i1c"' ,:1ls:J observr:.-; a pcJjr 0f ~~er1:11·s sh'JeS, the :'.ol 1~s 
'1'"'1 t !1 1_"' fnc,tt•ri11!·s _in tile· snO\·J Clll'-J f-...1:--i:i:.?r that the 1:1c:<:.-" • .. ;ns 
I Ii« l·~fl r.r1<v•; furt·hcr th;it thPrc ',·.'.JS " Cilood S'1car Cl!\ tii":' lc:'t 
ro111l,,l J(r·llcy \·1<1:-; orrc:stcd. ~:i':.cl1Gn knife i:<1s u::=:e.2 
,....-,1.i~iric.1 dr',11 \ 1 . !\ chC'c}: of ·.rictir.i' ~ ho-:-·e r0vealed no n10tchinq 
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l: ':r1 i ''CS ,l rr· rrcSC!l l. 
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/lll.L i\CllOl I I 2m sarisfied that th 0 re is 
r::1 the person (s) of ___ _ 
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·,, "• o:' S.ilt L;:il:~ rit'.' CoU!1ty of__J'nlt;_ L§_ke _________________ , 
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;-: ~: ': :. G' ~ (; ,::_ ~' : Tl i :. ''.l ': ( '.,: ':' 0 d C ; __::: ? 11 ,::! '. l I' t; ~)(!I~ '1 s }1 r 
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-, - - ) l1 
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